Ömer Murat*
The war triggered by US and Israeli strikes on Iran is rapidly reshaping the strategic landscape of the Middle East, and Turkey may not remain on the sidelines for long. Although Turkey has thus far remained outside the direct line of fire, Ankara now faces a difficult question: Could the conflict spill across its borders?
Signs of rising concern are already emerging. The United States has closed its consulate in Adana and advised non-essential personnel and family members to leave southeastern Turkey. The US Embassy also urged American citizens in the region to consider departing immediately, citing State Department travel guidance.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is confronted with a volatile mix of treaty obligations, domestic political pressures and the unpredictable moves of Washington and Tehran. Turkey is currently navigating a precarious middle ground: It is publicly critical of Washington and Israel, yet it still hosts key NATO infrastructure. However, the trajectory of the war suggests several scenarios that could put Turkey in an increasingly difficult position. These include possible attacks on military bases in Turkey, where the US and other NATO forces operate, the possibility of Kurdish unrest inside Iran, rising tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan and the economic shock waves of a prolonged regional conflict.
Since the war began, Iran has targeted American military facilities across the Middle East, particularly in Gulf Arab states and Jordan. Many of these strikes have focused on radar and early-warning systems that underpin American air defense networks.
Tehran’s strategy has been to disable expensive radar installations, often described as the “eyes” of missile defense systems such as the Patriot and THAAD batteries. This reduces the effectiveness of American defenses against missile and drone attacks.
Notably, Iran has thus far refrained from striking the military bases in Turkey where the US forces operate.
During the first nine days of the war, only one missile approached Turkish airspace and was intercepted after crossing the border. However, the situation appeared to escalate on Monday. Turkey’s defense ministry confirmed that a ballistic missile launched from Iran and entering Turkish airspace was intercepted by NATO missile-defense systems in the eastern Mediterranean.
The lack of further attacks has fueled speculation that Iran has deliberately avoided escalating tensions with Ankara. Had Tehran intended to strike these bases in Turkey, it would likely have launched multiple missiles or drones, as it did against American facilities elsewhere in the region.
Several factors may explain Iran’s caution.
First, there is the longstanding geopolitical equilibrium between Turkey and Iran. Their border, largely unchanged for nearly three centuries, is one of the most stable in the Middle East. Since the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry era, the two regional powers have learned that neither can easily establish decisive military dominance over the other. Consequently, they have generally preferred indirect competition through proxies rather than direct confrontation.
Second is the original strategic purpose of the presence of the American military in Turkey. Many of these installations were established during the Cold War, primarily to counter the Soviet Union. In contrast, American bases in Gulf countries were designed largely to deter or contain Iran. From Tehran’s perspective, the latter therefore represent a more immediate threat. Turkey’s NATO membership and the strength of its armed forces may also act as a deterrent.
However, one facility stands apart from the rest: the Kürecik Radar Base in eastern Turkey. Located in Malatya province, this installation houses an advanced AN/TPY-2 radar system that is part of NATO’s ballistic missile defense architecture. The radar can detect missiles launched from Iran early in their flight, providing crucial early-warning data for allied defense systems.
Security experts say Kürecik is the first link in NATO’s missile defense chain. Some analysts note that the radar’s data can indirectly support Israel’s Arrow missile defense systems. This could make the site a particularly sensitive target for Tehran.
In the early stages of the conflict, Iranian forces seem to prioritize disabling radar systems at American facilities in the region. Against this backdrop, the Kürecik installation could eventually become a target if Iran seeks to degrade the broader early-warning network.
Rhetoric from Tehran has reinforced these concerns. Recently, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, speaker of the Iranian parliament, warned that countries hosting the US military in the region would not find peace. The latest NATO interception and the US evacuation from Adana suggest that Tehran’s earlier restraint may already be eroding.
An Iranian strike on facilities such as Kürecik or İncirlik would put Erdoğan in a very difficult position. Much of the Turkish public views the United States and Israel as responsible for the war and sympathizes with Iran. Many Turks have praised Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez on social media for refusing to support American military operations against Iran and for declining to allow US forces to use bases in Spain.
If Turkey were to respond militarily to an Iranian attack, Erdoğan could be accused of effectively joining the United States and Israel in their campaign against Tehran. Conversely, failing to act would expose the hollowness of his anti-American rhetoric and raise questions about why he allows these high-risk “outposts” to operate.
A second scenario that could strain Turkey’s relations with both Washington and Tehran is a Kurdish uprising inside Iran. Early in the conflict US President Donald Trump explored that possibility by urging Iraqi Kurdish leaders to consider supporting an uprising in Iran. However, the effort appears to have stalled after Kurdish leaders declined to pursue such a path.
Trump may see Kurdish forces as a potential lever against Tehran to destabilize Iran’s central government, particularly if it begins to fracture. Air power alone may not be enough to force political change in Tehran without pressure from within the country. Bafel Talabani, president of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), recently warned on Fox News that such a movement could backfire by triggering Iranian nationalism and, more critically, Turkish military intervention.
For now, the idea appears to be on hold. However, if the war drags on and Washington struggles to achieve its objectives with air power alone, there could be renewed pressure to revive these strategies.
Should that happen, Turkey could find itself at the center of a major dispute with the United States. Washington might demand assurances that Ankara would not intervene against Kurdish groups. However, Turkish leaders would likely view such demands as unacceptable.
Another potential flashpoint lies to the east of Turkey, in Azerbaijan. The Iranian military recently issued an unusually direct warning to Baku, demanding the removal of what they described as an Israeli presence in the country. This statement marked a sharp escalation in rhetoric and signaled Tehran’s growing unease over Azerbaijan’s ties with Israel.
Those ties are substantial. Israel is one of Azerbaijan’s largest arms suppliers, providing advanced weaponry, including drones, radar systems and missile defense technology. The relationship runs both ways. Azerbaijan supplies more than 40 percent of Israel’s oil imports, making it an important energy partner for the Israeli economy.
For years Iranian officials have viewed Azerbaijan as a strategic foothold for Israel in the region. Tehran is also concerned that Baku might incite unrest among the significant Azerbaijani population in northern Iran.
If the Iranian leadership were to conclude that Azerbaijan posed a direct threat, especially given the country’s already intense military pressure, it could consider retaliatory strikes. Such a move would put Turkey in a difficult position. Ankara and Baku maintain an exceptionally close alliance, often summarized by the slogan, “Two states, one nation.”
Their military partnership was formalized in the Shusha Declaration, signed on June 15, 2021. The agreement stipulates that should the independence or territorial integrity of either country be threatened by a third state, the two governments will consult and provide the necessary support, including military assistance.
Therefore, an Iranian strike on Azerbaijan could create intense pressure on Turkey to intervene on Baku’s behalf, potentially bringing Ankara into direct confrontation with Tehran.
Even if Turkey avoids direct military involvement, the economic consequences of the war could be severe. Turkey relies heavily on imported energy, purchasing approximately 90 percent of its oil and nearly 100 percent of its natural gas from abroad. Consequently, spikes in global energy prices quickly translate into economic pressure.
Higher energy costs would likely push inflation upward, widen the current account deficit and increase pressure on the Turkish lira. This would raise the risk of a broader financial crisis.
The war could also drive up Turkey’s sovereign risk premium, as measured by credit default swaps, which would make it more expensive for the country to roll over external debt. In times of geopolitical turmoil, foreign investors often retreat from emerging markets in favor of safer assets.
Tourism, another critical pillar of the Turkish economy, could also suffer. The perception that the region is sliding toward a broader war could discourage visitors from Europe and elsewhere.
Finally, a prolonged conflict could trigger a new migration crisis. With a population of roughly 90 million, Iran is one of the largest countries in the Middle East. If security conditions deteriorate or the state begins to weaken, millions of people could attempt to flee.
Turkey already hosts millions of refugees from the Syrian civil war. A large influx of refugees from Iran, particularly ethnic Azerbaijani Turks, would present a politically sensitive challenge. Closing the border to them could prove difficult.
Turkey’s interior minister, Mustafa Çiftçi, has indicated that the government has prepared three contingency plans to address a possible migration wave. The first plan would intercept migration flows inside Iranian territory before they reach the Turkish border. The second plan involves establishing buffer zones along the frontier to contain movement if it cannot be stopped earlier. The third scenario would allow migrants to enter Turkey as a last resort, while keeping them under controlled conditions.
However, establishing a “deep security belt” on the Iranian side of the border could significantly increase the risk of direct military contact between Turkish and Iranian forces.
For now, Turkey appears determined to remain outside the war. Ankara has sought to maintain a careful balance, criticizing the conflict while avoiding actions that could provoke either side.
However, wars in the Middle East rarely remain confined to their initial battlefields. If the conflict drags on, NATO installations are attacked, unrest spreads inside Iran, tensions erupt between Iran and Azerbaijan, or refugee flows intensify, Turkey’s room to maneuver could shrink rapidly.
As the Iranian leadership enters a struggle for regime survival, Tehran may decide that broadening the theater of war is their only path to endurance. For Turkey, the luxury of being a spectator is quickly disappearing. The country’s geographic position may soon place it directly in the conflict’s path.
* Ömer Murat is a political analyst and a former Turkish diplomat who currently lives in Germany.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this opinion piece are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Turkish Minute.