Adem Yavuz Arslan*
The political landscape in Syria is undergoing a rapid and consequential transformation. As power balances shift on the ground, recent signals from Washington suggest not merely a tactical adjustment, but a broader recalibration of US policy, one with direct implications for Turkey–US relations and the wider regional order.
Over the past decade Syria has functioned as one of the most complex theaters of post–Arab Spring geopolitics: a collapsed state fragmented among regime forces, foreign militaries, militias and international proxies. Today, that era appears to be entering a new phase.
The United States has openly endorsed Syria’s transitional government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa while simultaneously declaring that its longstanding partnership with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has reached its end. For Ankara, this development is particularly significant.
For years, US cooperation with the SDF, whose military backbone is the People’s Protection Units (YPG), viewed by Turkey as the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a group designated as terrorist by Turkey, the US and the EU, has been the single most contentious issue between the two NATO allies.
Washington’s message is now unusually explicit: The SDF partnership, once central to the US-led campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) group, was never intended to be permanent.
A shift that was long in the making
From the outset American officials described cooperation with the SDF as tactical, conditional and temporary. The alliance emerged in 2014 under urgent battlefield conditions, when ISIL controlled large swaths of Syria and Iraq and Washington lacked viable local partners.
Over time, however, what began as an anti-ISIL arrangement evolved into a quasi-political relationship. Kurdish-led forces administered territory, formed governing structures and increasingly expected long-term Western security guarantees.
The formal acknowledgment that this partnership has now run its course therefore came as a shock to Kurdish actors on the ground, many of whom believed battlefield cooperation would eventually translate into political recognition or autonomy guarantees.
Yet from a strategic standpoint, the shift was predictable.
The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the emergence of a new centralized authority in Damascus fundamentally altered Washington’s calculations. The United States now appears more inclined to deal with a sovereign government, even one born out of instability, than to continue managing Syria through fragmented non-state actors.
This repositioning also coincides with renewed debate in Washington over a full withdrawal of US troops from Syria. Previous attempts were blocked by institutional resistance within the Pentagon and the national security bureaucracy, but political momentum toward disengagement now appears stronger than at any point since 2019.
Beyond Syria: a broader strategic reorientation
What is unfolding in Syria cannot be understood in isolation.
The United States is undergoing a deeper transformation in foreign policy, driven primarily by long-term strategic competition with China. Within this framework, the Middle East no longer occupies the central position it once held during the post-9/11 era.
Counterterrorism missions, nation-building experiments and open-ended military deployments have lost political support across party lines in Washington. Syria, costly, complex and peripheral to US great-power competition, has gradually slipped down the list of priorities.
This reality helps explain Washington’s increasing reluctance to maintain indefinite commitments to non-state armed groups. If the United States is willing to strain relations with major European allies over strategic realignment, it is unlikely to provide permanent protection to actors such as the SDF.
The emerging doctrine favors managed stability without deep involvement.
The objective is not to reshape Syria but to prevent renewed chaos that could once again pull Washington into military escalation. Within this framework Turkey’s longstanding security concerns, particularly along its southern border, are now receiving greater attention.
For the first time in decades Ankara is also engaging with a government in Damascus that is not structurally hostile to Turkey. This alone represents a profound shift in regional politics.
From non-state actors to regional powers
Another defining feature of the transition is Washington’s growing preference for working with states rather than militias or hybrid armed formations.
During the Cold War and its aftermath, the Middle East mattered largely because of energy security. Today, as the United States has become a net energy exporter, the region’s strategic relevance is being redefined.
China, by contrast, remains heavily dependent on Middle Eastern energy supplies. From Washington’s perspective, maintaining functional relations with recognized governments, rather than fragmented armed groups, has become more rational in the context of global competition.
This structural logic helps explain the gradual retreat from an SDF-centered policy.
In an era of strategic consolidation, temporary battlefield alliances are giving way to state-based diplomacy.
What Washington expects from Ankara
The recalibration of US policy raises an inevitable question: What does Washington expect from Turkey in return?
One key expectation is the containment of Iranian influence in Syria. Iran’s military and paramilitary presence, long sustained through militias and the Assad regime, has weakened considerably following the political transition in Damascus.
Turkey’s pragmatic engagement with Syria’s new leadership is increasingly viewed in Washington as a stabilizing mechanism capable of preventing Tehran from rebuilding its influence corridor stretching from Iraq to Lebanon.
Another sensitive dimension concerns Israel.
The United States continues to favor normalized relations between Turkey and Israel as part of its broader regional architecture. However, current political realities, particularly Israel’s domestic polarization and the Gaza war, make rapid normalization unrealistic.
Still, American policymakers appear to be positioning for a future moment when political conditions shift.
Notably, Israel has shown limited overt opposition to recent operations targeting the SDF, suggesting a tacit alignment around de-escalation rather than confrontation, even if public rhetoric remains tense.
Could this open doors elsewhere?
As the SDF issue gradually recedes, attention is turning to other unresolved disputes between Ankara and Washington, most notably Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system and its subsequent removal from the F-35 fighter jet program.
In Washington renewed discussions are underway about whether a political exit from this impasse is possible.
Yet structural constraints remain formidable. Congressional opposition, sanctions legislation and institutional resistance limit the executive branch’s room for maneuver. Even a cooperative White House cannot resolve these issues unilaterally.
Progress, if it comes, is likely to be incremental rather than transformative.
A structural, not personal, shift
Finally, there is the question of sustainability.
Is the current alignment between Ankara and Washington merely the product of personal rapport between leaders, or does it reflect something deeper?
Focusing on personalities risks obscuring the larger picture.
The United States is redefining its global posture, moving away from globalization-driven interventionism toward a narrower, interest-based model centered on strategic competition, regional burden-sharing and transactional diplomacy.
This transformation is structural, not cyclical.
Regardless of electoral outcomes in Washington, the era of expansive Middle East engagement is unlikely to return.
What is unfolding today, therefore, should not be understood as a temporary tactical adjustment, but as the early stage of a more restrained, pragmatic and interest-driven chapter in Turkey–US relations, one shaped less by ideology and more by hard geopolitical calculation.
In that sense, Syria is not the exception.
It is the signal.
*Adem Yavuz Arslan is a journalist with over two decades of experience in political reporting, investigative journalism and international conflict coverage. His work has focused on Turkey’s political landscape, including detailed reporting on the 2016 coup attempt and its aftermath, as well as broader issues related to media freedom and human rights. He has reported from conflict zones such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq, and has conducted in-depth research on high-profile cases, including the assassination of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink. Arslan is the author of four books and has received journalism awards for his investigative work. Currently living in exile in Washington, D.C., he continues his journalism through digital media platforms, including his YouTube channel, Turkish Minute, TR724 and X.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this opinion piece are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Turkish Minute.