[OPINION] How Ahmed al-Sharaa gained the upper hand in Aleppo

Ömer Murat*

Last week in Aleppo, Syria’s long-frozen internal balance of power entered a decisive new phase. The first direct confrontation took place between Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, who controls the area west of the Euphrates River, and Mazloum Abdi, commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who dominates the eastern side. This marked the opening round of a much broader struggle over Syria’s future. What unfolded was not merely a local clash but rather the first real test of shifting regional and international calculations.

Through a carefully orchestrated blend of military maneuvers and diplomatic efforts, al-Sharaa dismantled the SDF’s foothold in Aleppo. The SDF leadership underestimated the extent of Syria’s transformation. In particular they failed to grasp the emerging geopolitical landscape in the Middle East under US President Donald Trump’s administration, which increasingly favored al-Sharaa. Last year the SDF operated under the mistaken belief that without a comprehensive accord between al-Sharaa and Abdi, American sanctions on Syria would remain in place.

Yet Trump removed these restrictions independently of any such deal, driven not by personal affinity for al-Sharaa but by strategic alignment with Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Al-Sharaa’s trip to Washington, complete with White House imagery, coupled with the substantial easing of sanctions under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, bolstered his position significantly. This move enhanced al-Sharaa’s credibility particularly among Syria’s Sunni Arab majority.

The SDF compounded its errors by stalling in talks, betting that al-Sharaa’s position would erode over time. Instead, the passage of months only reinforced his leverage.

Another formidable challenge for al-Sharaa came from Israel, which maintained relentless pressure through airstrikes in southern Syria and incursions from the Golan Heights. Such actions hindered his ability to assert nationwide control. That pressure was eased last week in Paris through United States mediation, producing a quiet but consequential understanding between Israel and Syria. The resulting arrangement established a collaborative diplomatic and military framework, including a shared coordination unit. Consequently, Israel’s scope for unilateral military action now appears significantly constrained, with security concerns increasingly routed through this new mechanism.

With sanctions alleviated and the Israeli front stabilized, al-Sharaa cleared two major strategic hurdles, paving the way for the Aleppo campaign.

Meanwhile, the SDF’s rigid posture in negotiations with Damascus appears to have frustrated Washington. US officials seem eager for the SDF to relinquish control over certain Arab-dominated regions and swiftly negotiate with Damascus, yet the SDF has resisted. This likely prompted implicit US approval for al-Sharaa’s Aleppo initiative, serving as a subtle admonition to the SDF.

The SDF was caught off guard. Unaware that al-Sharaa had secured diplomatic latitude and was seeking an opening, SDF elements launched a drone strike on a Syrian military outpost in Aleppo on January 5. Seizing the moment, al-Sharaa moved quickly.

Aleppo’s selection was deliberate. For years the SDF held sway over Kurdish-dominated districts and a Christian enclave there, challenging al-Sharaa’s sovereignty claims. Critically, as Aleppo lies west of the Euphrates, it falls outside the informal United States–Turkey understanding from the civil war era, which confined American aerial protection for the SDF to the east. Al-Sharaa therefore chose a symbolically potent and strategically feasible site, one that Washington could accept and that aligned fully with Ankara’s interests.

The execution of the operation highlighted the acumen of al-Sharaa’s team. They laid diplomatic foundations beforehand and crafted ground tactics to reduce hazards. A pivotal tactic involved civilian management: Syrian forces urged the temporary relocation of residents from the Kurdish-dominated neighborhoods of Sheikh Maksud and Ashrafiya in Aleppo, and most complied. Had genuine fears of atrocities prevailed, such directives would have been ignored. This compliance undermined the SDF’s attempts to frame the events as ethnic cleansing and prevented that narrative from gaining local or international traction.

Coinciding with the operation, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Union Council President António Costa jointly visited Damascus, signaling robust Western confidence in al-Sharaa as Syria’s principal interlocutor.

This endorsement stems from al-Sharaa’s measured approach to minority communities and his efforts to contain extremist factions over the past year. Despite lingering tensions in Alawite and Druze areas, Western governments increasingly view al-Sharaa as a manageable partner, temporarily overlooking the regime’s shortcomings amid suspicions of Iranian and Israeli involvement in those flare-ups.

In Aleppo the wisest course for the SDF would have been a negotiated retreat with modest concessions. Instead, they opted for defiance, and their resistance collapsed rapidly. Structural weaknesses, particularly Abdi’s limited autonomy from the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leadership in Kandil in northern Iraq, may have contributed to this defeat. This linkage has long been a source of concern for both Washington and Ankara. If reports in Turkey’s pro-government media attributing contacts between the SDF and Iran and Hezbollah are accurate, they would further erode trust in Western capitals.

For President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey, al-Sharaa’s stability and survival are strategically indispensable. His collapse would produce immediate heavy domestic and foreign policy repercussions for Ankara. Consequently, Turkey backed al-Sharaa’s Aleppo campaign politically and militarily and shows no sign of changing course.

Some Kurdish actors hope that the peace initiative launched last year with the PKK might prompt Turkish recognition of the SDF. The events in Aleppo demonstrate how unrealistic that expectation remains. Official Turkish statements continue to stress that the process aims to dismantle the PKK in all its components, including the People’s Protection Units (YPG), which constitute the SDF’s backbone. For Ankara, recognition of the SDF within its current territorial structure remains unthinkable. Erdoğan may see dialogue as a way to buy time while al-Sharaa consolidates authority, but Turkey’s core strategic position remains unchanged.

Looking ahead, al-Sharaa is likely to increase pressure on the SDF, raising the probability of wider clashes. For now Ankara prefers to support Damascus indirectly. However, if battlefield dynamics begin to favor the SDF, Turkey is unlikely to hesitate before intervening directly.

Aleppo marks a turning point. The easing of Caesar sanctions, the Israel–Syria understanding, Europe’s open engagement and Turkey’s strategic guarantee have elevated al-Sharaa to the dominant position in Syria. The SDF now faces its most difficult period, both militarily and diplomatically.

Al-Sharaa has won the first round. What follows may determine the final outcome of Syria’s long, unfinished war.

* Ömer Murat is a political analyst and a former Turkish diplomat who currently lives in Germany.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this opinion piece are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Turkish Minute.