, recent high-level statements are testing the core principles that have defined the Turkish Republic since its founding in 1923.){kind=link}
As Turkey navigates a fragile peace process with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), recent high-level statements are testing the core principles that have defined the Turkish Republic since its founding in 1923.
Turkey became a republic on October 29, 1923 within the borders and framework recognized in the July 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which was signed after Turkish insurgents successfully fought off allied forces’ occupation following the Ottoman Empire’s defeat in World War l. A unitary, centralized nation-state was established based on a singular Turkish identity. The new republic rejected the Ottoman Empire’s millet system that had allowed limited cultural autonomy for ethnic and religious groups and instead pursued policies of assimilation, banning non-Turkish languages in public life and denying legal recognition to distinct ethnic identities — including Kurds, Alevis and others.
These principles formed the basis of Turkey’s constitutional and administrative structure, which excluded group-based rights, federal arrangements or multicultural power-sharing. Today, as Kurdish groups call for recognition, legal reform and democratic inclusion, these once-unquestionable assumptions are being challenged
Kurdish political leaders, civil society groups and diaspora activists are preparing to mark the 102nd anniversary of the Treaty of Lausanne this Saturday with a mass march and open forum in Lausanne, Switzerland, where the original treaty was signed in 1923. The event, organized by the Kurdistan National Congress (KNK), is framed as a direct challenge to what they call a “collapsed status quo” that denied Kurds recognition as a people and partitioned their homeland among four states.
Zübeyir Aydar, a senior member of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) Executive Council, said in an interview with the Nupel Haber news website ahead of the demonstration that the 1923 treaty “was a death sentence” for Kurds and that a new international agreement is needed to reflect the evolving realities in the Middle East. “The Lausanne order has been breached. Kurds were never mentioned, and we are still paying the price,” Aydar said, arguing that recent regional upheavals — particularly the Israeli military campaign in Gaza, the conflict with Iran and its proxies and the December 2024 regime change in Syria — have created the conditions for a new political framework that must include Kurdish rights.
Saturday’s gathering is expected to feature speeches, proposals and declarations from Kurdish groups across Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran as well as minority representatives from the Assyrian and Syriac communities. While past anniversaries have been marked by remembrance, this year’s focus will be on “today and tomorrow,” organizers said.
The Lausanne protest comes against the backdrop of an ongoing peace initiative inside Turkey. Since February, following a call by PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan from his prison cell on İmralı Island, the militant group has signaled its readiness to end its armed conflict in favor of a political solution. On July 11, 30 PKK fighters publicly destroyed their weapons in a ceremony in the northern Iraqi city of Sulaymaniyah, a gesture described by observers as unprecedented in the group’s four-decade conflict with the Turkish state.
In a recent interview, KCK co-chair Cemil Bayık warned that no further steps can be taken unless Turkey enacts “freedom and democratic laws” and dismantles what he called the “İmralı isolation system,” referring to Öcalan’s continued imprisonment. Bayık emphasized that the Kurdish side has fulfilled its commitments and that “the state must now act.” He dismissed amnesty as insufficient, calling instead for legislative guarantees and constitutional reform.
“What’s needed is democratic participation, legal equality and an end to political persecution,” Bayık said.
The pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) echoed that view in a statement following its July 22 party assembly in Ankara. Referring to Öcalan’s February message and the recent PKK ceremony to give up its weapons, DEM Party leaders said the process has reached a critical turning point that requires “confidence-building democratic steps” by the government. They called for a parliamentary commission to draft legislation supporting democratic integration, equality and freedom of expression.
“This is not only about the Kurds,” the statement read. “It is about creating a shared future under a new constitutional framework that reflects the will of all peoples of Turkey.”
The political establishment has also shown signs of grappling with the implications of the peace initiative. On July 18 Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli surprised many by proposing that Turkey appoint one Kurdish and one Alevi figure as vice presidents. The proposal marked a sharp departure from the MHP’s historically hardline stance and was widely interpreted as a concession to the reality of Turkey’s social diversity and the political weight of the Kurdish issue.
“Kurds are our people. Alevis are our people. We are all the Turkish nation,” Bahçeli said. DEM Party co-chair Tuncer Bakırhan responded pointedly, asking “Why not a Kurdish president?”
While President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has not directly endorsed Bahçeli’s proposal, he has praised the PKK ceremony marking the laying down of arms as a “national victory” and emphasized that “Turks, Kurds and Arabs all emerged as winners.”
Observers note that there is a multi-layered convergence of de-escalation of armed conflict, political negotiations and public discourse challenging the strict boundaries of Turkish nationalism as enshrined in the 1923 Republic. However, risks remain.
Bayık warned that the crackdown targeting members of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) could derail the initiative. “How can a peace commission in parliament be formed if the opposition is under arrest?” he asked.
Despite the momentum, there is skepticism in some quarters about whether the Turkish state will commit to structural changes. Yet the conversation has undeniably shifted — from denial of any possible recognition of Kurdish identity to what constitutional and political future the country might now share with its Kurdish population.