, it is common to refer to Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed founder of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), in derogatory terms like "baby killer" or "the murderer of 40,000 martyrs." They even refrain from referring to him as the "leader of the PKK," designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey and its Western allies, and find it more appropriate to refer to him as the "head of the terrorists."){kind=link}
Ömer Murat*
Among ultranationalist circles in Turkey, whose main party is the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), it is common to refer to Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed founder of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), in derogatory terms like “baby killer” or “the murderer of 40,000 martyrs.” They even refrain from referring to him as the “leader of the PKK,” designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey and its Western allies, and find it more appropriate to refer to him as the “head of the terrorists.”
This is the reason why MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli’s call to Öcalan, who is serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole in a high-security prison near İstanbul, during a parliamentary group meeting on October 22 was no less than shocking for the Turkish public. In his speech Bahçeli suggested that if Öcalan’s “isolation” — restrictions on his prison rights — were lifted, he could attend a parliamentary group meeting of the pro-Kurdish People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) and call on the PKK to lay down its arms, adding that if he took this step, a law could be passed to pave the way for his possible release.
Since then, the Turkish public has been debating what Bahçeli meant by this call, and still, no one has been able to give a convincing explanation. At first, the call was seen as related to the regime’s efforts to amend the constitution. According to this view, in order to pass constitutional amendments without resorting to a referendum, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan needs the support of the DEM Party’s votes in parliament. To avoid a referendum, at least 400 parliamentary votes are needed, which requires the support of either the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) or the DEM Party.
However, this interpretation is not convincing. If the government’s real goal was amending the constitution, one would have expected them to seek agreements with ideologically closer parties such as the CHP, the Good (İYİ) Party or the Felicity Party (SP), rather than risk alienating their nationalist base by turning to the DEM Party. But the government approached the DEM Party without any visible effort to include these other parties. This is despite the fact that in the run-up to the May 14, 2023 elections, the Public Alliance led by Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Bahçeli’s MHP accused the opposition Nation Alliance of planning to release Öcalan if it won. It would be much harder for the government to justify such an alliance with the DEM Party to its supporters.
In addition, one of Erdoğan’s chief advisers, Mehmet Uçum, deputy chairman of the presidential board for legal policy, said in a written statement on September 12 that any new constitution adopted by parliament must be put to a referendum. He wrote: “Even if the parliament adopts a brand new constitution with 400 or more votes, it must be submitted to a referendum, and the new constitution should only come into effect if it is approved by more than 50 percent of the public.”
Any change to the constitution in alliance with the DEM Party is also incompatible with Erdoğan’s goals. There is no reason why he should feel obliged to take the risk of allying with the DEM Party to amend the constitution. The ruling AKP leader does not hesitate to take steps that clearly violate the current constitution. Given the erosion of the separation of powers in Turkey, there is no authority capable of holding Erdoğan accountable for such violations. Perhaps the most glaring example of this is the government’s refusal to enforce some rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in favor of Erdoğan’s opponents. Although the constitution mandates compliance with these rulings, courts under the influence of the ruling party openly disregard them in flagrant defiance of constitutional law.
This raises the question of what Erdoğan is really trying to achieve through constitutional amendments. Some have suggested that his primary goal is to ensure his eligibility for re-election. While it is true that Erdoğan cannot legally run again if the elections are held as scheduled, this restriction disappears in the event of early elections. For Erdoğan, there is little difficulty in calling early elections because the constitution gives him the authority to make this decision unilaterally.
I think Erdoğan’s real motive behind the constitutional amendments is to prevent powerful opposition figures like İstanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu and Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş from running against him in the presidential election. Polls by various research firms consistently show that either İmamoğlu or Yavaş would likely defeat Erdoğan in a runoff election. (How Erdoğan could accomplish this through constitutional amendments might be a topic for another article.)
If changes to the constitution were truly the issue, Bahçeli’s call would likely have been directed not at Öcalan but at Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtaş, who is also imprisoned. While Öcalan is the leader of an organization that Turkey has long designated as a terrorist group and actively fought for decades, Demirtaş is a politician who has never taken up arms. A process of normalization led by Demirtaş would be far easier for the ruling party’s base to accept than one led by Öcalan. Moreover, Demirtaş is a leader who has earned the respect of not only DEM Party voters but also Kurds who support the AKP.
A study titled “The Kurdish Issue, Kurdish Politics, and Demirtaş” published by Rawest Research in May 2024, which includes face-to-face interviews with 1,406 participants, revealed that even the Kurds who support the AKP see Demirtaş as a reasonable and negotiable political figure. While they associate the prominent figures of Kurdish politics with the PKK, they do not see Demirtaş in the same light.
Despite all this, why does the regime choose to approach Öcalan rather than Demirtaş for a new process of normalization with the Kurds? I believe the answer lies in the very reasons for Demirtaş’s arrest on politically motivated charges in November 2016 and his continued detention. Erdoğan attributes the AKP’s partial electoral defeat on June 7, 2015, when the party failed for the first time to win enough votes to govern alone, to Demirtaş. During that election, Demirtaş effectively used the slogan, “We will not make you president.” Demirtaş’s popularity among Kurdish voters, including those who also support the AKP, poses a significant challenge to Erdoğan’s electoral strategy.
According to a report in the newly founded Nefes newspaper, during a meeting with Bahçeli in parliament, the DEM Party delegation attempted to raise the issue of the continued imprisonment of Demirtaş, only to be silenced with a dismissive gesture from the MHP leader signaling, “Don’t get into that.” It is worth noting again that it is Öcalan, not Demirtaş, whom ultranationalists often refer to as the “baby killer.”
All of this still leaves the central question — the very title of this article — unanswered: What is Bahçeli really up to with his call to Öcalan in this context? The events that unfolded in Syria, leading to the ouster of Bashar al-Assad shortly after Bahçeli’s statement, have fueled suspicions that his call may be more closely tied to developments in Syria than to domestic issues in Turkey.
The Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria (AANES), also known as Rojava, which emerged during the civil war in Syria, has an armed force called the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the main backbone of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), known to be an offshoot of the PKK. According to the official stance of the Turkish government, Rojava’s existence will no longer be tolerated after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s rise to power in Syria. AANES is to be completely dismantled through military operations carried out by Turkey, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army or the new government in Damascus.
In separate statements on Monday and Tuesday, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan declared that the eradication of the Kurdish YPG militia in Syria was “imminent” and stressed that Ankara would not accept any policy that allowed the YPG to maintain a foothold in the country. He also warned about a military operation against the Kurdish forces in Syria unless they accepted Ankara’s conditions for a “bloodless” transition.
While Demirtaş wields considerable influence among Turkey’s Kurds, Öcalan is regarded as the symbolic leader of Syria’s Kurds, with his photograph prominently displayed in official buildings throughout Rojava. Bahçeli’s appeal to Öcalan suggests that despite its public rhetoric, the Erdoğan regime may be pursuing a covert understanding with the YPG.
It is not yet clear if a potential compromise will be realized, or if and how it might unfold. If President Erdoğan were to initiate a military operation in Syria against the YPG, despite the concerns expressed by Western countries, particularly the US, it could be perceived as a failure of the reconciliation efforts.
*Ömer Murat is a political analyst and a former Turkish diplomat who currently lives in Germany.