Ömer Murat*
Under Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, elections are often decided long before ballots are cast, during a prolonged pre-election phase in which rivals are identified early and the political field is shaped to his advantage.
At the center of this struggle are two opposition figures: Ekrem İmamoğlu, the mayor of İstanbul, and Mansur Yavaş, the mayor of Ankara. Both are members of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Turkey’s main opposition party. They have both demonstrated an ability to appeal to centrist and even center-right voters who once supported Erdoğan, reaching beyond the party’s traditional secular base.
For Erdoğan, the identity of his opponent has always been central to his political strategy. His campaigns have been less about policy contrasts and more about framing the race as a contest between his conservative-nationalist bloc and an opposition he portrays as alien to the country’s religious and cultural mainstream.
This formula was easier with former CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. His profile allowed Erdoğan to revive familiar partisan fault lines. However, İmamoğlu and Yavaş complicate that strategy. Their mayoral victories in İstanbul and Ankara demonstrated their ability to energize opposition voters and attract conservatives disillusioned with Erdoğan’s rule. This broader appeal undermines the politics of fear that has long underpinned Erdoğan’s electoral dominance.
In this context the legal campaign against İmamoğlu has taken on outsized political significance. His arrest and the revocation of his university diploma have been presented by the government as part of a corruption investigation. Yet multiple independent surveys suggest that the public is unconvinced by this framing despite aggressive coverage from the pro-government media. For example, Özdemir Research found that more than half of respondents view the arrest as unjustified, while only one-fifth consider it legitimate. Other polling shows broad support for protests against the detention and a majority viewing the case as politically motivated.
The government’s effort to portray the case as a straightforward legal matter has failed to persuade a majority of the electorate. Instead, many Turks interpret the proceedings as an attempt to sideline a formidable political rival. If voters come to view legal proceedings as instruments of political engineering, Erdoğan’s longstanding strategy of managing the electoral field risks losing credibility.
The March 31, 2024, local elections were a major setback for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). The CHP emerged as the leading party nationwide, widening its margins in İstanbul and Ankara. This outcome not only signaled municipal losses for the AKP but also a symbolic shift in political momentum.
In response Erdoğan has shown little inclination to heed the electorate’s verdict. Murat Kurum, the AKP candidate who lost to İmamoğlu in İstanbul, was subsequently appointed to a ministerial position, placing him in a supervisory role over municipalities. Meanwhile, trustees were appointed to certain opposition-run municipalities, and investigations targeting CHP mayors intensified. These steps were widely seen as efforts to reassert central control over local governments that had slipped from the ruling party’s grasp.
Through these actions, Erdoğan conveys a clear message to his opponents and the public: Electoral setbacks may dent his position, but the apparatus of the state remains firmly in his grasp, leaving little room for defiance without repercussions. A similar pattern followed the June 2015 parliamentary elections, when political instability preceded a snap vote that restored the ruling party’s majority.
The promotion of Akın Gürlek, the former İstanbul chief public prosecutor overseeing cases against İmamoğlu, to justice minister reflects that continuity. In Turkey’s presidential system, ministers exercise limited autonomy, making such appointments read less as routine reshuffles than as signals of intent.
Meanwhile, the reshuffle at the Interior Ministry seems tied to internal dynamics within the governing coalition. The relationship between the AKP and its ally, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), is often mediated through security institutions. Under former interior minister Süleyman Soylu, MHP-affiliated figures gained prominence; however, during outgoing Ali Yerlikaya’s tenure, some reportedly faced removal. Public criticism from figures close to the MHP, formally directed at Yerlikaya, also reflected underlying tensions within the alliance. As Erdoğan seeks to tighten control ahead of elections, his choice of a less controversial figure to lead the interior ministry aligns with his aim to project stability while intensifying pressure on opponents.
Polls also reveal mounting disillusionment with both the government and the opposition. The CHP’s inability to leverage its 2024 gains into sustained challenges, exacerbated by the defection of some party members to the AKP amid coercion, has bred skepticism. Persistent economic woes, including soaring prices and widening disparities, affect large segments of society, yet voters doubt both sides’ ability to provide solutions.
Many viewed the CHP’s decision to engage in a process of “normalization” with Erdoğan after the local elections as a missed opportunity to capitalize on its gains. This strategy, championed by CHP leader Özgür Özel, seemed to provide the ruling party with breathing room after its loss.
This creates a political rift that diminishes the overall credibility of the system. Erdoğan’s longstanding argument that his rule offers stability versus disorder may falter in a climate of perceived economic disarray, as many now equate his governance with instability itself.
The CHP now faces a dilemma. Abandoning the potential candidacies of İmamoğlu or Yavaş could demoralize its supporters. However, supporting them could lead to increased legal and political pressure from a politicized judiciary.
Meanwhile, the ruling system requires a manageable counterweight to maintain the façade of competitive democracy. A weakened or absent CHP would strip the system of even nominal legitimacy. Conversely, an unfettered opposition poses risks for Erdoğan. This dual dependency, needing opposition participation while constraining its effectiveness, makes the coming electoral cycle unusually fragile.
These domestic tensions coincide with mounting global uncertainty. Escalating competition between the United States and China, along with the possibility of broader regional conflict involving Iran, the United States and Israel, could amplify economic vulnerabilities in countries like Turkey.
While ramping up domestic controls could temporarily contain the situation, the fiscal toll might be unsustainable, much like the unforeseen economic fallout from İmamoğlu’s detention.
Erdoğan is poised to escalate his efforts to restore his preferred electoral dynamics. Meanwhile, the opposition must navigate the peril of either capitulating, which could erode its essence, or resisting, which carries steep costs.
Societal grievances over finances and governance are mounting. Erdoğan’s familiar warnings of anarchy without him may ring hollow. In a context where his leadership is blamed for the turmoil, voters might argue that disorder would persist regardless.
The coming months will test not only the electoral strategy of Erdoğan, but the resilience of Turkey’s political order itself.
* Ömer Murat is a political analyst and a former Turkish diplomat who currently lives in Germany.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this opinion piece are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Turkish Minute.