Ömer Murat*
The grounds for the arrest of İstanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, as stated by numerous local and international experts, bear no relation to the charges brought by the prosecutor. As Amnesty International noted, the arrest of İmamoğlu “represent[s] a massive escalation in the Turkish authorities’ ongoing crackdown on peaceful dissent and the targeting of the main political opposition party CHP,” just days before it was expected to choose the mayor as its presidential candidate.
The underlying reason for the arrest is that İmamoğlu’s popularity has grown significantly, posing a substantial threat to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. İmamoğlu has emerged victorious in the mayoral election on three occasions, with each triumph representing a significant setback for Erdoğan. Notably, in the 2019 mayoral election, the judiciary, under the influence of the government, annulled the results on dubious grounds, yet İmamoğlu prevailed in the subsequent re-run by a significant margin. In the 2024 election, İmamoğlu’s victory was even more pronounced, with a margin of over a million votes, despite Erdoğan’s extensive use of his propaganda machine to mobilize support for his party’s candidate. These electoral outcomes marked the most significant defeats of Erdoğan in his entire political career. İstanbul, the most populous city in Turkey and its financial and cultural epicenter, had historically served as Erdoğan’s political base. His rise to power began when he won the mayoral election in İstanbul in 1994.
The reasons for İmamoğlu’s success are manifold. He has demonstrated an ability to draw support beyond the confines of the secular Republican People’s Party’s (CHP) grassroots, which makes up less than 25 percent of the electorate. He has the political acumen and charisma to reach out to various segments of society, a feat that no other Turkish leader in recent years, with the exception of Erdoğan, has been able to accomplish. Significantly, İmamoğlu was able to attract votes from conservatives, Turkish nationalists and Kurds alike, showing his ability to transcend partisan divides.
The heightened polarization within Turkish society is a key factor in determining the outcome of the elections, especially in the context of Erdoğan’s resounding victories. Facing such a formidable and widely appealing candidate in the 2028 elections is a considerable challenge for the leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Numerous polls have indicated that İmamoğlu will triumph over Erdoğan in the presidential election by a significant margin. It has now become clear that Erdoğan is unwilling to allow a candidate with a real chance of defeating him to run against him.
However, it is crucial to recognize that the CHP also bears a responsibility for the fact that the mayor of İstanbul, who was elected with 4.5 million votes, was so easily arrested and removed from office on flimsy grounds. Since a failed coup on July 15, 2016, the Erdoğan regime has dismissed tens of thousands of civil servants, including high-ranking bureaucrats, judges, diplomats, academics, teachers and doctors, on similar terrorism charges through a series of government decrees known as KHKs. Many of these individuals have been imprisoned for years, and, regrettably, the CHP has consistently exhibited a strong tendency to condone these actions of the Erdoğan regime.
The CHP’s reaction to the regime’s weaponization of counterterrorism laws has been criticized for its apparent selectivity as it has been observed that it only reacts with greater severity when these laws are directed against its own supporters. A notable example of this selective approach was the CHP’s reaction to the “KHK victims,” many of whom are associated with the faith-based Gülen movement, but some of whom are also liberals and Kurds. The party’s position was that those who were acquitted by the courts should be reinstated to their previous positions.
This stance is predicated on the assumption that the courts, under Erdoğan’s influence, will be able to make the decisions required by the law. In many cases, however, these courts are not even allowed to implement the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which is normally a constitutional requirement. It is estimated that less than one in 10 victims of the KHKs have been acquitted by the courts. If the CHP is to adopt a similar approach now in order to maintain consistency, it should articulate the following: that if the charges against İmamoğlu are cleared by the courts, he should return to office and then run as a presidential candidate. Hence it is imperative to confront populist authoritarians, such as Erdoğan, with a political approach that is congruent with one’s principles and values. It is essential to refrain from emulating their tactics, as this strategy is likely to garner the respect and support of a diverse array of societal groups.
With the arrest of İmamoğlu, the regime has undoubtedly entered a new phase. It is becoming clear that the regime is led by an autocrat who behaves as if he has been elected for life. By dealing with the “İmamoğlu problem” in this way, Erdoğan believes that from now on he can manipulate the opposition elites through the use of incentives and coercion and thus maintain the status quo. However, in my opinion the broader base of the opposition will no longer be fooled by this “theater of democracy.”
Erdoğan’s electoral strategy entails instilling fear in his base by portraying the opposition as a threat to his rule, thereby ensuring their electoral support. With the removal of İmamoğlu, the absence of a formidable political opposition capable of challenging Erdoğan in the electoral process has become increasingly obvious. As a result, the AKP leader is likely to lose his crucial leverage to polarize society and consolidate his nationalist, conservative base by claiming, “If you don’t vote for me, the secularists and the Kurds will come to power.” The credibility of this narrative is likely to erode rapidly, and the regime is likely to face significant challenges in the near future. The suppression of social dissent, coupled with the absence of viable opposition, is likely to precipitate unexpected economic and political crises, potentially leading to the destabilization of the entire regime.
It is evident that Erdoğan’s ambition to emulate a Putin-style autocracy has been nearly realized through the arrest of İmamoğlu. However, in contrast to Russia, Turkey is not a country abundant in energy and natural resources, thus necessitating the attraction of foreign investment to maintain economic stability. Societies often temper their democratic demands when their economic expectations are met. However, the erosion of the rule of law and democracy under Erdoğan’s leadership has led to considerable challenges in attracting foreign investment to Turkey, further exacerbating the ongoing economic problems.
This has contributed to his declining popularity, and the AKP leader does not possess the substantial financial resources like Putin to appease public discontent. Last week’s market turmoil was a harbinger of things to come. The Central Bank of Turkey had to burn through $11.5 billion in a single day to prop up the falling lira after İmamoğlu’s arrest.
The strongman’s ability to neutralize political opponents is well known. However, he appears to lack a comparable aptitude for effectively managing the economy, a deficiency that has not escaped the attention of the populace, which is grappling with the repercussions of a profound economic crisis.
*Ömer Murat is a political analyst and a former Turkish diplomat who currently lives in Germany.