Ömer Murat*
It is no secret that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and former US President Joe Biden were not on the best of terms, so the Turkish leader did not hesitate to hide his delight at Trump’s election for a second term. There was a chill between the two leaders stemming from Biden’s approach of trying to distance himself from populist leaders as much as realpolitik would allow. Erdoğan, therefore, thought that Trump’s return to power would be a relief for him.
However, Trump’s foreign policy moves have so far actually put Erdoğan in a tricky spot. For example, Trump’s approach to the Gaza issue, which involves the use of ethnic cleansing through a kind of deportation of all Palestinians living in the Strip, left Erdoğan uncertain how to respond. Typically, he would have employed provocative rhetoric to mobilize Turkish public opinion against the US, but this wasn’t the case. He didn’t respond at first, letting other officials speak for him, and then, when the opposition criticized his notable silence, he denounced the plan, albeit in a manner that conspicuously eschewed direct censure of the American president.
Trump’s decision to break with the Western consensus on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and initiate direct communication with the Kremlin without consulting his European allies was another dramatic foreign policy move that got off to a disappointing start for Erdoğan. While delegations led by the US and Russian foreign ministers had already met in Riyadh under Saudi mediation, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky paid an official visit to Ankara the same day. At a joint press conference, Erdoğan subtly expressed his dissatisfaction with what he perceived as a lack of consideration from Trump and Putin, stating, “Our country would be an ideal host for future meetings between Russia, Ukraine and America.”
However, there is currently no indication that this offer will be taken up. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called the foreign ministers of France, Germany, Italy and the UK as well as the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs to inform them of the Riyadh meeting, in an effort to reassure European allies who were concerned that they were being left out of the negotiations with Russia. But no such briefing was deemed necessary for Turkey.
French President Emmanuel Macron, who convened two emergency meetings with European leaders last week to decide on a response to the crisis triggered by Trump’s dramatic shift in Russia policy, did not feel it necessary to invite Erdoğan to either of them.
Western countries are understandably uneasy about Erdoğan’s tacit cooperation with Putin to circumvent the comprehensive sanctions they had imposed on Russia after the start of the Ukraine war. The Biden administration’s repeated imposition of sanctions on specific Turkish companies involved in circumventing these sanctions is an indication of this discomfort. Trump was seen as a bit of a wild card; hence, there were hopes in Ankara that he might bring about a positive shift in Turkey’s favor. However, it appears that the Trump administration was not particularly keen on Turkey as a venue for this significant meeting, despite Erdoğan’s high expectations. This may be due to the perception that the Turkish leader lacks the influence and ability to significantly influence the course of events.
Similarly, Russia, which chose İstanbul as the venue for peace negotiations three years ago, does not seem to be prepared to give Turkey a special role this time. It was foreseeable that the role played by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham supported by the Erdoğan government in the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and Russia’s hasty “expulsion” from the Middle East because of it would lead to a cooling of relations between Moscow and Ankara.
Despite Erdoğan’s self-proclaimed commitment to a balanced policy towards both Russia and the West during the Ukraine war, neither side had real confidence in him. Moreover, Turkey’s ongoing economic crisis rendered him unable to wield significant leverage.
This is even though during the war Turkey was involved in setting up the so-called “grain corridor” in the Black Sea, which ensured the export of vital food supplies from Ukraine to the rest of the world. Turkey was also involved in mediation efforts in the early stages of the conflict. Since then, Turkey appears to have lost ground.
In Ankara, Zelensky stressed the importance of comprehensive security guarantees for Ukraine. He asked, “If it is not NATO, who will be able to provide us with these guarantees?” and added, “We have also discussed with President Erdoğan possible security guarantees, including from strong countries with powerful militaries, such as Turkey.”
If Ukraine were to accept the loss of territory to Russia in a peace deal, it would undoubtedly demand security guarantees to protect itself from renewed Russian invasion attempts in the future. Turkey could contribute to the military forces to be deployed in Ukraine as part of these guarantees. However, Turkey’s potential contribution to the military forces to be deployed in Ukraine as part of a peacekeeping force will depend on its ability to shoulder the financial burden of such an operation. Given Turkey’s current economic challenges, the feasibility of such a contribution remains uncertain. Even if Turkey were to contribute troops to such a force, it is likely to demand that Europe cover a significant proportion of the associated costs, a scenario that would potentially disadvantage Turkey in negotiations on the matter.
For Erdoğan, who is intent on tightening his autocratic grip on power at home, the opportunity to boost Turkey’s role on the world stage, especially in the West, is too good to pass up. He is well aware that he can use Turkey’s growing geopolitical importance as a means of deflecting criticism from the West, as was demonstrated during the “refugee crisis.” However, the early signs of changes in global politics following Trump’s election do not support this.
Erdoğan had expected to reap significant benefits from maintaining a neutral stance between the West and Russia; however, it appears that this policy has, to date, merely resulted in Turkey being regarded as an entity that is not really close to either side, as opposed to being seen as an indispensable, impartial mediator.
*Ömer Murat is a political analyst and a former Turkish diplomat who currently lives in Germany.