Cevheri Güven

Two members of parliament from the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) visited Abdullah Öcalan, the founding leader of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), at İmralı Prison in the final days of 2024. Kurdish politicians had last been able to meet with Öcalan in April 2015, after which President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government refused to allow such encounters.

Does allowing representatives of Kurdish politics to reconnect with Öcalan after nine years signal a willingness to resolve the Kurdish issue on Erdoğan’s part, or is it driven by his AKP’s domestic political needs. One might find the answer to this question in developments unfolding in Syria.

Bahçeli’s surprising proposal

On October 22 Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and an ally of Erdoğan, made a statement about Öcalan that stunned everyone.

During his party’s group meeting in parliament, Bahçeli proposed allowing Öcalan to apply for the “right to hope” and speak at the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) group meeting on the condition that he disband his organization.

Right to hope is a term used to describe a prisoner’s right to hope for a better future, often discussed in terms of chances of parole for those serving a life sentence.

Öcalan has been imprisoned since his capture in February 1999. Initially sentenced to death, his sentence was commuted to life in prison in 2002 following Turkey’s abolition of the death penalty. He has been held on İmralı Island, located in the Sea of Marmara, where he was the sole inmate for a decade.

Öcalan has been incarcerated for over 25 years. If parliament amends the law to make parole a possibility for those serving life sentences, the PKK leader might be eligible.

Bahçeli, as head of the MHP — a party founded on Turkish nationalism — has historically denied the existence of a distinct Kurdish identity, asserting that Kurds are part of the Turkish nation. The MHP has long opposed rights for Kurds, such as education in their native language, arguing that such measures would lead to the country’s division. Bahçeli has consistently referred to Öcalan as a separatist leader and a notorious terrorist.

Thus, the suggestion of releasing Öcalan, even on the condition of disbanding his organization, was shocking not only to the general public but also to Bahçeli’s own party.

Speculation arose that the proposal had been made without Erdoğan’s knowledge. However, Erdoğan openly supported Bahçeli’s call, confirming that the two leaders had coordinated on the matter beforehand.

This alignment was underscored by subsequent developments: The Ministry of Justice, after years of prohibiting visits to Öcalan, granted permission for visitors. Initially, Öcalan’s nephew, Ömer Öcalan, a DEM Party MP, was allowed to meet with him. Later, a more official meeting was organized, with DEM Party MP and Deputy Speaker of Parliament Sırrı Süreyya Önder and DEM Party MP Pervin Buldan visiting Öcalan as a delegation.

The second visit was presented to the public as an official DEM Party delegation meeting. Öcalan’s messages were communicated through formal channels, in which he emphasized his readiness to take the initiative and make a call for peace, underlining the importance of the process initiated by Bahçeli and Erdoğan.

PKK rejects proposal to lay down arms

Although Bahçeli tied Öcalan’s potential release to the condition that the PKK lay down its arms, sparking debate, the PKK’s leadership promptly rejected the proposal.

Mustafa Karasu, a founding member of the PKK and current member of its Executive Council, was the first to respond to Bahçeli on behalf of the organization. Referring to Bahçeli’s call for Öcalan to disband the group, Karasu said: “Devlet Bahçeli has invited the Leader [Öcalan] to parliament. What did he [Bahçeli] say? ‘Come and disband your organization.’ What does it mean to disband the organization? It means surrendering the political will and strength of a people. This is something we’ve been fighting for over 50 years. Tens of thousands of martyrs have fallen for this cause. He is essentially saying, ‘Come and dissolve it, surrender.’ That is the implication.”

Another senior PKK leader, Murat Karayılan, acknowledged that Bahçeli’s engagement with Öcalan was significant but described the proposal as “completely irrational and unacceptable.”

The PKK viewed the proposal to disband in exchange for Öcalan’s release as tantamount to surrender and immediately dismissed it.

Despite the PKK’s negative response, President Erdoğan took a second tactical step following Bahçeli’s statement, which had come to be known as the “call to Öcalan.” On December 28, Erdoğan permitted two members of parliament from the DEM Party to visit Öcalan.

Calls aligned with the regime change in Syria

The recent statements and steps by President Erdoğan and his ally Bahçeli concerning Öcalan are closely tied to the regime change in Syria. Erdoğan anticipated months in advance that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) would move to overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and began preparing for political moves concerning the Kurds accordingly.

HTS is not entirely under Turkey’s control, although it coordinates closely with Turkey. Thus, the plan to overthrow Assad was known to Turkey months in advance, likely with Russia’s tacit approval.

Since 2016 Erdoğan’s primary concern in Syria has not been Assad but the Syrian Kurds, with Turkish military operations in Syrian territory targeting the Kurds rather than Assad. Knowing in advance that the final move to depose Assad would take place, Erdoğan planned and implemented the process of renewing calls to Öcalan and facilitating visits to him before Assad’s fall.

Erdoğan’s move to reintroduce Öcalan — not allowed to air political messages through the flagship pro-Kurdish party for nine years — into the political arena was motivated by desperation.

Erdoğan is a leader who has squandered his country’s capabilities in foreign policy while presiding over a collapsing economy. He knows there is nothing he can do to stop the Kurds from achieving a status quo in Syria. Soon the public and opposition will ask, ‘Why doesn’t Turkey, like Israel, use its military to eliminate perceived threats, such as the YPG [Peoples’ Protection Units] and other Kurdish groups, in Syria?’ These questions will intensify as the Kurds solidify their status in Syria.

Erdoğan, unable to use the full force of the Turkish army against the Syrian Kurds, resorted to sending National Intelligence Organization (MİT) chief İbrahim Kalın and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to Damascus, asking HTS leader and Syria’s de facto president Muhammed al-Jolani to apply pressure on the Kurds. While Jolani made statements to appease Turkey, HTS has avoided engaging in conflict with the Kurds on the ground.

In his desperation to counter the formation of a Kurdish region and status quo in Syria, Erdoğan has sought to bring Öcalan back into the public discourse. By presenting himself as a leader dealing with Turkey’s Kurds domestically, Erdoğan aims to deflect attention from the reality of a Kurdish administration forming beyond Turkey’s borders for the second time during his tenure.

The first instance of Kurds gaining such status outside Turkey occurred in Iraq. For decades, the possibility of a Kurdish entity in Iraq was a red line for Turkey, considered a national security threat. However, during Erdoğan’s first term as prime minister, the Kurdistan Regional Government was formally established and recognized in the Iraqi Constitution in 2005.

Now, on Erdoğan’s watch, a similar situation is unfolding in Syria. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), led by Mazloum Abdi, are on the verge of creating an autonomous Kurdish region in Syria. Having established strategic ties with the United States and Israel, Syrian Kurds are militarily stronger than their counterparts in Iraq.

Erdoğan, known for his skill in shaping public opinion, has brought Öcalan into the spotlight precisely when needed. While the Turkish president may navigate this process with minimal political damage, the long-term impact of Kurdish regional administrations in Iraq and Syria on Turkey’s Kurds remains to be seen.