Ali Soylu, Ph.D.*
The mesmerizing power of traditional state structures has always attracted individuals. People have been willing to fight not only with their rivals but even with their own siblings to acquire and maintain this extraordinary power. History is filled with examples of the struggle to control the collective power known as the state.
With the shift from a state-centered governance approach to a people-centered one, individual and family dominions have given way to the institutions that make up the state. This change has led to the emergence of a new sovereignty model under the mask of pluralistic democracy, where state power is concentrated in the hands of institutions. The alluring power of the state has now stirred the appetite of these institutions. Institutions that believe they have a larger share in the functioning and maintenance of the state have started to influence governance, sometimes openly and sometimes covertly sharing power in Turkey.
Institutions, especially those holding judicial and military power, have begun to see themselves as above the legislative and executive branches, considering themselves to be the true owners of the state. Observing this situation in Turkey’s history is sufficient. While it was expected that the enormous power would be used by the politicians elected, these ego-driven institutions intervened when necessary (such as the Turkish Armed Forces, the Constitutional Court, etc.). Despite being in power under the guardianship of the judiciary and the military for many years, politicians who were supposed to represent the people could not exercise true power.
During the first 20 years of the Turkish Republic, state power was concentrated in the hands of a single individual such as the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and İsmet İnönü, Atatürk’s right-hand man and his successor as president. After World War I, this power began to be shared among institutions in Turkey. This sharing, with the approval of the civilian authority, continued for half a century. The sharing of state power between elected officials and institutions came to an end with the launch of investigations into some army generals and officers based on documents regarding coup plans uncovered by journalist Mehmet Baransu (who has been held behind bars since 2015), their subsequent trials, and finally the 2010 referendum, through which constitutional amendments were approved, making the military more accountable to civilian courts and giving parliament more power to appoint judges.
However, as the goal of advanced democracy was being emphasized, the December 17-25, 2013 corruption investigations began in which the close circle of then-prime minister and current president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan were implicated, and those targeted used state power to obstruct these operations, sidelining the judiciary and reversing the progress in democracy and freedoms.
Since 2002, the state power, which was partially controlled by state institutions, has returned to being entirely under the control of a single individual (dictator), like the early years of the Turkish Republic. This “single ruler-one party state” has also refused to relinquish state power. This “single ruler-Erdoğan” built a network of interest groups around himself through years of groundwork. These groups consisted of individuals who were obliged to unconditionally obey and accept everything the “single ruler-Erdoğan” said. These individuals, who saw the extraordinary opportunities provided to them by the state power as favors from Erdoğan’s regime, have developed a deep sense of gratitude towards him. Believing that the continuation of these benefits depended on the “tyrant remaining in place,” they have overlooked the existing injustices, unethical practices and corruption.
Ending this superficial unethical/illegal alliance based on interest relations is possible. Opposition party leaders, politicians, civil society organizations and bar associations must inform/educate/lecture and organize the public to awaken the electorate. Just as courageous journalists (e.g., Baransu), prosecutors (Celal Kara, Zekeriya Öz, Muammer Aktaş, Mehmet Yüzgeç) and police chiefs (Yakup Saygılı, Kazım Aksoy, Nazmi Ardıç, Yasin Topçu), who all exposed government corruption, ended institutional oppression, voters who begin to see the truth can bury Erdoğan’s “one-party state” regime at the ballot box. Otherwise, Turkey’s return to peace and security, as well as its development, will not be possible.
* Ali Soylu is an associate professor of management at Cameron University in Lawton, Oklahoma.
Twitter: @DrSoylu