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Mass hysteria sets in: Gülen movement scapegoated for all troubles in Turkey, big and small

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Bünyamin Tekin

Earlier this year, a lawmaker who was elected to the Turkish parliament while he was in jail for protests was stripped of his parliamentary status.

The parliament did not even vote on the status of Can Atalay, a member of the Workers Party of Turkey (TİP) who had been elected to parliament in May 2023; the mere reading of the verdict was enough to erase his parliamentary role.

The session erupted into chaos as opposition deputies voiced their outrage, chanting angrily and attempting to halt the proceedings.

Atalay remained in prison despite his parliamentary immunity. The Constitutional Court had twice ruled that Atalay’s rights were violated, yet the 13th High Criminal Court referred the case back to the Supreme Court of Appeals, which confirmed Atalay’s 18-year sentence from the Gezi Park trial, ignoring the Constitutional Court’s rulings.

Atalay and others convicted in the Gezi Park trial were accused of attempting to overthrow the government during protests initially sparked by an urban development plan in İstanbul that evolved into broader anti-government demonstrations.

The protests, driven largely by young people, displayed widespread discontent with corruption and the increasingly authoritarian rule of then-prime minister and current president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The government responded with force, leading to a crackdown on protest leaders.

What was remarkable, and one can say an indication of the mass hysteria that gripped the Turkish nation, was the reaction of one of the defendants in the case.

“The reputation of Fethullah has been restored by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey,” tweeted Mücella Yapıcı, a Turkish architect and activist known for her efforts to protect İstanbul’s urban, cultural and historic heritage.

Yapıcı, who played a significant role in the Gezi Park protests and was convicted along with Atalay and received an 18-year sentence, was referring to Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen, whose views inspired the Gülen movement.

The movement is accused by Erdoğan and his government of masterminding a failed coup in July 2016 and of terrorism. The Gülen movement strongly denies both accusations.

The Gülen movement is the subject of constant scapegoating in Turkey, although many of its followers are behind bars on bogus terrorism or coup charges or had to flee abroad to avoid government persecution.

Erdoğan, who has been targeting followers of the Gülen movement since the corruption investigations of December 17-25, 2013, which implicated then-prime minister Erdoğan, his family members and his inner circle and was labelled as a “coup” by Erdoğan against his government by members of the Gülen movement in the bureaucracy and judiciary, intensified the crackdown on the movement in the aftermath of a coup attempt on July 15, 2016 that he accused Gülen of masterminding. Gülen and the movement strongly deny involvement in the abortive putsch, any terrorist activity or the corruption investigations.

Many likened Erdoğan’s post-coup crackdown to a witch-hunt.

In Turkey, a state of emergency declared after the 2016 coup attempt facilitated a vast crackdown on various groups, resulting in mass dismissals and imprisonments.

The crackdown on possible coup plotters has since been turned into an all-out witch-hunt not only against alleged Gülen sympathizers but also leftists, Kurds and anyone critical of the government.

Nevertheless, the hysteria surrounding the Gülen movement stands out, and it permeates various aspects of Turkish society and politics, to the point where other repressed groups scapegoat the Gülenists for their predicament.

Take jailed Kurdish leader Selahattin Demirtaş, who was recently sentenced to more than two years in prison for “denigrating the Turkish state.” His speeches between 2015 and 2017, in which he criticized Erdoğan and other government officials, led to multiple investigations and his eventual conviction.

What stands out in Demirtaş’s case is his use of the term “FETÖ,” a derogatory acronym used by the government for the Gülen movement, in a manner that lines up with the government’s demonization of the group.

By invoking this rhetoric, Demirtaş and other Kurdish politicians align with the government’s narrative, leveraging the term to emphasize their dissociation from the group and to underline their own political legitimacy. This alignment illustrates the extent to which the Gülen movement has been demonized, to the point where even the oppressed adopt the government’s language to accuse their oppressors.

Kurdish politicians bring up the supposed “FETÖ” ties of a prosecutor who drafted the indictment leading to the removal of a Kurdish mayor from southeast Turkey.

In this climate, both oppressors and the oppressed chant the same slogan, using the “FETÖ” slur to accuse each other. This dynamic allows the government to consolidate power by portraying a wide array of political dissidents as terrorists. The label of “FETÖ” is wielded to justify a wide range of repressive actions, from judicial decisions to political purges, thereby maintaining an atmosphere of fear and control within Turkish society.

On Monday Dr. Meriç Demir Kahraman, the wife of city planner Tayfun Kahraman, who was one of the convicted Gezi defendants, tweeted a condemnation of the injustice her family has faced, specifically targeting those she labels as “FETÖ” operatives for orchestrating her husband Tayfun Kahraman’s imprisonment.

Kahraman used the government’s derogatory term for the Gülen movement to accuse her oppressors. Her stance underscores the pervasive atmosphere of fear and blame, where the label “FETÖ” is thrown around to condemn anything one opposes.

The hysteria extends to the aftermath of high-profile murders, such as that of Sinan Ateş, the former leader of the ultranationalist Grey Wolves.

Ateş was assassinated in Ankara in December 2022. His widow, Ayşe Ateş, accused the Turkish authorities of falsely blaming the Gülen movement for her husband’s murder to protect the real masterminds behind the killing. During the trial, 10 defendants were released, and Ayşe Ateş denounced the court’s decision as a “conspiracy play,” claiming that the trial was manipulated and the indictment flawed. She alleged that the authorities were using the Gülen movement as a convenient scapegoat to divert attention from the true perpetrators.

Of course, it is not limited to murders.

In a related instance of hysteria, Justice and Development Party (AKP) member Metin Külünk on Monday accused the Gülen movement of being behind a bill submitted to parliament involving the euthanasia of stray animals, which received significant backlash from animal lovers.

“There’s a smell of FETÖ in this; they are setting a trap for Erdoğan,” Külünk tweeted.

Despite the bill clearly originating from the ruling party, Külünk’s statement reflects the pervasive tendency to blame the Gülen movement for any controversy or backlash that affects the AKP’s image, a tactic that could be described as gaslighting the Turks not to blame the government for its shortcomings.

In the aftermath of Turkey’s devastating earthquakes in 2023, the president of the Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay), Dr. Kerem Kınık, blamed the Gülen movement for the government’s poor response.

Journalist Fatih Portakal questioned why the authorities chose to plan all search and rescue operations through Turkey’s Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) instead of the well-established Kızılay. Kınık responded that the civil protection mechanism was “brought down” by FETÖ, again invoking the Gülen movement as the scapegoat for the government’s failures. This accusation further exemplifies how deeply embedded the practice of blaming the Gülen movement has become in Turkey’s political discourse.

In 2018 two defendants who worked at a hospital in İstanbul and were accused in a scandal involving 115 pregnant minors, blamed the Gülen movement for plotting against them. The trial highlighted the lengths to which individuals and officials would go to deflect blame onto the Gülen movement, regardless of context or evidence.

The label can be used to explain any incident or denigrate any person disliked by the one who uses the term.

Foreign nationals, including diplomats and Christian pastors, have also been accused of being secret members of the Gülen movement. This tactic has effectively silenced many critics, dampened public protest initiatives and fostered a climate of fear across the country.

The accusation of being a FETÖ member has become a powerful tool for the government to stifle dissent, leading to the imprisonment and persecution of thousands.

The irony is that Erdoğan and many senior government elites once praised Gülen’s work. After coming to power in 2003, Erdoğan and his government’s promises of reform, which they delivered until the 2010s, were supported by the Gülen movement.

The relationship turned into enmity after Erdoğan accused Gülen and his followers of orchestrating a coup over a corruption scandal involving his son.

His crackdown extended globally, with Turkey pressuring other countries to close Gülen-affiliated institutions and extradite members of the movement. Despite Erdoğan’s efforts, many in the international community view the Gülen movement as a peaceful, civic initiative focused on education rather than a terrorist organization.

The hysteria has had tangible effects on Turkey’s political and social landscape. Citizens live in fear of being labeled as Gülenists, which can lead to imprisonment, loss of livelihood and social ostracizing. Public dissent has been significantly muted, with many afraid to voice their opinions online or participate in protests. The government’s branding of the Gülen movement as a terrorist organization has silenced many critics and consolidated Erdoğan’s power.

A couple of examples will help the reader understand the gravity of the situation.

Immediately after the assassination attempt on former US president Donald Trump during an election rally in Pennsylvania on July 13, social media was abuzz with hot takes, with everyone postulating who was behind it.

“I predict that whoever carried out or ordered the assassination attempt on Trump will have connections to FETÖ,” tweeted Atılgan Bayar, who served as an advisor to a prime minister in Turkey, mere hours after the attempt took place.

After many mocked his theory, Bayar doubled down.

“My prediction that those behind the assassination attempt on Trump would be connected to FETÖ may seem far-fetched to some. However, those familiar with the American political system know that Pathetic Liberals are surely linked to FETÖ,” he tweeted.

After Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, along with Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and several other officials, died in a helicopter crash on May 19, a journalist working for Turkey’s state broadcaster TRT, didn’t take long to invoke the Gülen movement as being a possible culprit.

“There is a structure similar to FETÖ in Iran, perhaps there is FETÖ. There can be no other explanation for these oddities,” Öznur Küçüker Sirene tweeted.

The mass hysteria surrounding the Gülen movement in Turkey is a product of years of political manipulation and fear-mongering.

The movement has become a convenient scapegoat for a wide range of issues, from judicial controversies and high-profile murders to institutional scandals and natural disaster responses, or any issue to one’s dislike.

This hysteria has stifled dissent, eroded public discourse and created a climate of fear and repression.

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