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[OPINION] Erdoğan could pursue a policy of ‘controlled escalation’ in Syria

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Ömer Murat*

Since rebels led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) toppled the Assad regime on December 8, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly threatened to launch a military operation against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Turkey considers the main component of the SDF, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), to be affiliated with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

However, no military action has yet taken place. Instead, we have seen the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) carry out some operations against the SDF that have not significantly changed the situation on the ground.

The introduction of a bipartisan bill on December 20, introduced by Democratic Senator Chris Van Hollen and Republican Senator Lindsey Graham and threatening sanctions on Turkey over military action against Kurds in Syria, was instrumental in this outcome. During the Senate confirmation hearing of Trump’s secretary of state nominee Marco Rubio on January 15, Van Hollen directly linked Turkey’s failure to take military action against the SDF to the threat of sanctions from the United States.

However, the election victory of Donald Trump, who promised during his campaign to withdraw all American troops from the Middle East, has undoubtedly boosted Erdoğan’s expectations of forcing the United States to align itself with Ankara’s interests in Syria. Erdoğan’s recent speech, in which he called on “all foreign powers to withdraw from the region” and declared that “if the SDF does not lay down its arms, its head will be crushed,” is related to these expectations.

But Rubio’s response at his confirmation hearing was equally unequivocal. When Senator Van Hollen asked if he agreed with continuing to support the SDF in the fight against ISIL, Rubio was straight in his answer when he said that support for the SDF would “absolutely” continue. He also sent a direct message to Erdoğan, warning him not “to see the change of administration in the US as a ‘window’ for taking advantage of or violating agreements with the Syrian Kurds.” It’s also important to note that Trump gave a noncommittal response to a question about whether he would “immediately withdraw US troops from Syria” during a press conference on December 17.

It seems likely that Syria will not be among the first issues addressed by Trump upon taking office. There’s a clear discrepancy between his campaign rhetoric and his actions. During his election campaign, for example, Trump vowed to end the war between Russia and Ukraine “in a day.” But after his election, even before his inauguration, he extended the deadline to six months. The withdrawal of US troops from Syria is also likely to take longer than Erdoğan expects.

The HTS will face significant obstacles in improving the economic situation in Syria and achieving normalization due to US sanctions (called the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act) imposed during the Assad era. Rubio asserts that the lifting of these sanctions will depend on the new Syrian regime fulfilling certain conditions, including protection of the Kurds.

Consequently, Washington will not only use its military presence in Syria to prevent potential attacks on the SDF but will also use the threat of “economic sanctions” against both Ankara and Damascus for the same purpose. This policy has always had the potential to increase tensions in US-Turkish relations.

With all this in mind, I think there are three main ways things could go with Erdoğan’s Syria policy. First, Trump could withdraw US troops from Syria and Erdoğan could take out the SDF through military operations with the SNA and HTS. That would certainly be Erdoğan’s dream scenario, but I don’t think it’s likely to happen.

The second is that the US won’t withdraw from Syria and will make Damascus respect the autonomy of the SDF as a condition for lifting the Caesar sanctions. Similarly, Erdoğan will be threatened with economic sanctions, including the disclosure of his assets, if he takes military action against the SDF.

Given the difficult economic situation in Turkey, it seems unlikely that Erdoğan will be able to meet the economic needs of the HTS, and he may find it difficult to afford US sanctions if he takes military action against the SDF.

It is therefore possible that Erdoğan will agree to recognize the SDF, the autonomous administration of the Syrian Kurds in what they call Rojava. This move could potentially ease some of the existing tensions between Ankara and Washington, and it would allow Erdoğan, who did not receive an invitation to the White House during the Biden era, to focus on strengthening his relationship with Trump, with whom he has a closer bond.

This second scenario seems better for Erdoğan in terms of foreign policy, but not so much in terms of domestic politics. Erdoğan’s popularity is falling fast, mainly because of the economic crisis that has made life harder for the lower and middle classes.

According to the first opinion poll of the year, conducted by the Yöneylem Research January 3-7, Erdoğan is about 10 points behind the opposition candidates in a possible presidential election. When asked, “If the presidential election were to be held next Sunday, would you vote for Erdoğan or the opposition candidate?” 47.5 percent of respondents answered “the opposition candidate,” while 37.1 percent said they would vote for Erdoğan. A total of 53.6 percent of respondents thought the country wasn’t well governed, while only 24.1 percent thought it was. Fully 85.7 percent of participants said that the country’s most important problems were the economic crisis and inflation.

If Ankara wants the second scenario to happen, it’ll have to open channels of communication with the SDF and normalize relations. The Erdoğa regime could use Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK, as a mediator. (I touched on this issue in my previous article.) However, according to an opinion poll conducted by Metropoll Research November 17-20, only 21.9 percent of respondents found far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli’s call to Öcalan, inviting him to parliament to announce the dissolution of the PKK, “right,” while 71.9 percent found it “wrong.”

So if Erdoğan recognizes the SDF, he’ll lose a key card for whipping up the nationalist base around him by playing up the “PKK threat” and the “threat of Turkey’s division.” This would be detrimental to his political goals, especially given the current economic turmoil. It is also noteworthy that Erdoğan’s approach to domestic politics seems to be leaning more towards nationalism. Derya Kömürcü, general coordinator of Yöneylem Research, points out that a new wave of nationalism could emerge in the next year or two and that Erdoğan has been strengthening his base through nationalism rather than conservatism in recent years.

Against this backdrop, it is plausible to consider a third scenario in which Erdoğan might adopt a policy of “controlled tension” in his dealings with the SDF. On the one hand, he will try to persuade Trump to withdraw US troops from Syria, taking advantage of potential disagreements within the US administration on this issue. At the same time, he’ll put pressure on the HTS and the SNA to go after the SDF, even though he knows this won’t change the situation on the ground. He will also play to Turkey’s nationalist base by saying that the Turkish armed forces could launch a military operation in Syria at any time.

The government-controlled media (which is currently 90 percent of the media in Turkey) will also push the narrative that “foreign powers like Israel and the US are trying to establish a Kurdish state in Syria with the ultimate goal of dividing Turkey, and that Erdoğan is fighting to prevent this.”

Within this framework, it is possible that the pressure on the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) will increase, possibly through the arrest or continued detention of its prominent leaders, the appointment of trustees to replace its mayors and other measures to facilitate Erdoğan’s electoral calculations.

Erdoğan can’t play the game in Syria alone, but he can “spoil the game.” He’ll prevent any deal that would legitimize the SDF, but he’ll also avoid taking direct action against it, which could lead to a deterioration in his relations with the US.

The biggest risk of this approach is a miscommunication between Erdoğan and Trump, like what happened in 2019 when Trump threatened to “ruin the Turkish economy” and wrote him a letter saying, “Don’t be a fool!” while trying to persuade Erdoğan to reverse a decision to invade Syria.

*Ömer Murat is a political analyst and a former Turkish diplomat who currently lives in Germany.

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